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Abstract This paper investigates the impact of negative
screening on the investment universe as well as on financial
performance. We come up with a novel identification
process and as such depart from mainstream socially re-
sponsible investing literature by concentrating on indi-
vidual firms’ conduct and by studying a much wider range
of issues. Firstly, we study the size and financial perfor-
mance of fourteen potentially controversial issues: abor-
tion, adult entertainment, alcohol, animal testing,
contraceptives, controversial weapons, fur, gambling, ge-
netic engineering, meat, nuclear power, pork, (embryonic)
stem cells, and tobacco. We investigate an international
sample of more than 1,600 stocks for more than twenty
years. We then analyze the impact of applying negative
screens to a market portfolio. Our findings suggest that the
choice for negative screening strategies does matter for the
size of the investment universe as well as for risk-adjusted
return performance. Investing in controversial stocks in
many cases results in additional risk-adjusted returns,
whereas excluding them may reduce financial performance.
These findings suggest that there are opportunity costs to
negative screening.
Keywords Controversial investments  Market
capitalization  Responsible investing  Risk-adjusted
returns  Screening
Introduction
Sustainability, ethics, and social responsibility are notions
that increasingly concern both individual and institutional
investors. The domain of socially responsible investing
(SRI) persuades investors to align ethical and financial
concerns, as well as to impact on firms’ environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) performance (Renneboog
et al. 2008; de Colle and York 2009). To achieve this,
responsible investors have developed a variety of innova-
tive strategies, including ‘best-in-class’ investing, active
ownership, and ESG integration (Eurosif 2014). SRI has
gradually matured when it became adopted by more and
more investors (Sparkes and Cowton 2004). Interestingly
though, the original SRI practice of excluding stocks of
companies involved in harmful or controversial activities
(so-called sin stocks) remains the most common SRI
strategy today (GSIA 2012; Eurosif 2014).
What does it mean for an investor to employ negative
screens on her universe of potential investments? And does
it matter for financial performance which particular screens
are being employed? In the past decade, numerous em-
pirical studies have been conducted in the field of SRI.
However, these studies offer inconclusive results and in
several respects are still at an early stage. For instance,
current research in SRI lacks sound definitions and metrics
for responsibility, which probably forms an impediment for
an adequate assessment of the size of SRI and its value to
investors, companies, and society as a whole (Scholtens
2014). With respect to the impact on returns, studies on
responsible and ‘sin’ investing have provided conflicting
results. While some find positive abnormal returns for sin
stocks (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk 2009), others do not
find them at all Lobe and Walksha¨usl (2011) and conclude
that shunning these sin stocks does not significantly impact
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financial performance (Salaber 2009; Humphrey and Tan
2014). As to the number of stocks (and their combined
market capitalization) to be invested in, various studies
have suggested that screening has a fairly small impact
(Fabozzi et al. 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Salaber
2009; Durand et al. 2013a, b; Salaber 2013; Humphrey and
Tan 2014). Lastly, most previous research has left unex-
plored a wide range of issues other than the widely studied
combination of tobacco, alcohol, and gambling stocks
(known as the Triumvirate of Sin).
We employ a comparative analysis on fourteen poten-
tially controversial issues for the period 01/1991–12/2012.
In contrast to most other studies, we do not rely on broad
industry classification and discarding complete industries,
but rather check the fourteen issues at the level of the
individual firm. As such, we investigate more than 1,600
controversial stocks. The issues we analyze are abortion/
abortifacients, adult entertainment, alcohol, animal testing,
contraceptives, controversial weapons, fur, gambling, ge-
netic engineering, meat, nuclear power, pork, (embryonic)
stem cells, and tobacco. Some of these issues are highly
prevalent reasons for exclusion in responsible investing
(e.g., alcohol, weapons, gambling, tobacco, adult enter-
tainment). Other issues are less well-established and in-
stitutionalized. Still, these are being used in private
mandates of investors, and the number of controversies
seems to increase (Eurosif 2014). To clarify, part of our
study is closely related to current investment practices as it
investigates widely adopted screens. But part of the re-
search might be regarded as somewhat more hypothetical
as it investigates the exclusion of particular potentially
controversial activities that are not yet widely recognized
as controversial in the responsible investment industry,
although for several individual investors excluding firms
engaging with these activities would well align with their
personal values. For such controversial activities, our study
highlights the potential financial effect on investment
performance.
We find that controversial investments generally yield
positive abnormal returns, and that screening produces sub-
optimal financial performance. Furthermore, in contrast to
previous research, we observe screening to be applicable to a
large number of stocks, representing substantial market
capitalization. Lastly, we show that controversial issues other
than the usually studied ones also are material and therefore
relevant to the study of responsible and ‘sin’ investing.
Our paper contributes to the literature on SRI in several
ways. First, it opens up for philosophical analyses of the
concept of negative screening in SRI. Second, we provide
detailed new insights into the characteristics of controver-
sial issues, and the effect negative screens may have on the
universe of common stocks available to investors through a
unique directly constructed sample of controversial stocks
using the ORBIS database. Third, we include methods that
are novel to the literature by presenting least absolute de-
viation (LAD) estimations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We
first provide a background to responsible investing and
negative screening. Then we introduce the data and
methods used. Next, we present and discuss our results. We
end with a brief conclusion.
Background
In this section, we briefly review the empirical literature
and highlight important (but often overlooked) philo-
sophical concerns with negative screening policies.
While there is a large body of literature suggesting a
positive relationship between measures of CSR or SRI and
stock performance (Sparkes and Cowton 2004; Landier and
Nair 2009; Margolis et al. 2009), there is growing evidence
to the effect that investing in controversial stocks results in
superior performance. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find
that a classical Triumvirate of Sin portfolio (comprising
alcohol, gambling, and tobacco stocks) of 156 US stocks
outperform industry-comparable stocks during 1965–2006.
These controversial stocks might be undervalued as a result
of being neglected by norm-constrained investors (e.g.,
pension funds). The above findings have been confirmed by
Durand et al. (2013b) for the US, Salaber (2013) for Eur-
ope, Visaltanachoti et al. (2009) for China and Hong Kong,
and Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) for France. A
global study by Fabozzi et al. (2008) finds similar results
for the classical controversial sectors combined with de-
fense, biotech (comprising animal testing, genetic engi-
neering, and ordinary stem cells), and adult entertainment.
However, several studies are unable to confirm the
above findings. For instance, Salaber (2009) finds no out-
performance for 183 US Triumvirate of Sin stocks relative
to industry-comparable stocks. Similar results are obtained
by Lobe and Walksha¨usl (2011). Durand et al. (2013a)
even observe negative risk-adjusted returns for controver-
sial stocks in the Pacific-Basin markets. Lastly, outperfor-
mance of sin stocks may be contingent on religious and
legal factors (Salaber 2013).
With respect to negative screening, the academic literature
is inconclusive as well. Some authors have suggested that
funds consisting of sin stocks outperform themarket aswell as
screened SRI portfolios (Chong et al. 2006; Jo et al. 2010;
Liston and Soydemir 2010; Durand et al. 2013b). A recent
study by Humphrey and Tan (2014) directly applies Tri-
umvirate of Sin plus Defense screens to benchmark indexes
(e.g., the S&P500) and finds that excluding controversial
stocks from these indexes does not damage performance. A
study by Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) for SRI funds
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in the period 2004–2007 finds a curvilinear relationship be-
tween sectoral screening intensity and financial performance.
In all, the existing literature needs to be interpreted with
caution, and it is important to realize that findings might be
specific to country, culture, investor characteristics, time
period, and methodological choices (cf. Kumar et al. 2011;
Kiymaz 2012; Durand et al. 2013a; Salaber 2013; Schol-
tens and Sieva¨nen 2013; Hood et al. 2014).
Prior to the empirical issues discussed above at least one
philosophical issue deserves our attention. The concern is
that, ironically, the practice of screening out controversial
sectors itself is controversial. Firstly, the avoidance of
controversial stocks by institutional investors might be
incongruent with fiduciary duty law when controversial
investments outperform responsible ones (Richardson
2013). Secondly, de Colle and York (2009) argue that
sector-based negative screening practices of SRI fund
managers are not justified as these fail to accurately reflect
investors’ values and moral orientations. Ethical screening
may thereby not be as ‘ethical’ as its name suggests (cf.
Schwarz 2003; de Bruin 2013). For example, de Bruin
(2013) observes hardly any solid normative foundations for
screens on the alcohol industry. He opposes the common
public goods argument for such negative screens by raising
concerns with democratic legitimacy and effectiveness.
While some investors might rightly refuse to invest in
particular industries or firms, this would be based on their
personal beliefs and values. However, such a basis applies
to a limited number of investors and is problematic when
used by involuntary chosen funds (as is the case with many
pension schemes and healthcare plans). We think it is
likely that sectoral screens other than those on the alcohol
industry are built on unsound normative arguments as well.
Considering the instrumental ineffectiveness of negative
screening to advance responsible corporate behavior (see
e.g., Heinkel et al. 2001), some authors have argued in
favor of positive screening practices (e.g., Landier and Nair
2009). In addition, norm-based negative screening could be
used to improve ethics and governance issues in global
financial markets (Richardson 2013). However, these in-
stances of screening face severe problems as well, in-
cluding informational complexity, large differences in
measuring methods, and a lack of clarity and transparency
on specific methodologies (Margolis et al. 2009; Sandberg
et al. 2009). And, of course, any form of screening (posi-
tive or negative) is vulnerable to the above-mentioned
problems as the practice of screening by definition implies
the selection of some companies and the exclusion of
others. Therefore, other strategies such as engagement
might be preferable over negative screening for pragmatic
reasons (cf. Woodbridge 2011). In all, while negative
screens have been important to the development and some
success stories of SRI (Landier and Nair 2009; Richardson
2013), they often seem to lack normative substance. In-
vestors, both individual and institutional, may reconsider
their motivations for sector-based screens and critically
evaluate whether shunning these stocks would be the best
strategy to achieve their stated ends.
In the remainder of this study,wewill investigatewhat could
be the financial consequences of investment decisions to shun
particular groups of stocks. We do realize that for some in-
vestors, financial consequences are not very important or might
not play a role at all. Several of the controversial issues we
investigate already are widely accepted as screens within re-
sponsible investing, suchas alcohol, tobacco, andgambling. For
others, the responsible investment industry does not yet offer
investment vehicles, and investors will have to manage their
own investment portfolio in line with their views and values.
Data and Method
We employ a comparative mean-variance analysis on four-
teen potentially controversial issues. We investigate the
prevalence of ‘sin’ in the investment universe, and whether
negative screening consequently represents a loss in size (i.e.,
market capitalization). Second, we investigate risk-adjusted
returns of controversial stocks and test for differences be-
tween controversial stocks and themarket, as well as between
negatively screened portfolios and the market. In this section,
we describe our sample construction process and the methods
of investigating size and return performance.
Previous studies have used broad industry classifications to
construct ‘sin portfolios.’ We, however, contend that this
approach is questionable for several reasons. First of all, broad
industry codes do not capture all potential involvement in
particular controversial sectors as ‘sin’ is not the basis for
industry classification, leading to an incomplete representa-
tion of the actual universe of controversial stocks. Second, a
substantial number of (potential) controversial issues have no
industry classifications or are difficult to capture using broad
classifications (e.g., abortion, adult entertainment, genetic
engineering). Third, contrary to the statements of Salaber
(2013), we think that issues other than tobacco, alcohol, and
gambling are also of interest to responsible investors and
therefore material to the study of controversial stocks.
The fourteen controversial issues are selected and de-
fined analogous to commonly employed definitions of ‘sin’
by ESG raters and SRI funds (see Renneboog et al. 2008;
Fabozzi et al. 2008; MSCI 2013; Capelle-Blancard and
Monjon 2014). We want to emphasize that we by no means
contend that one should regard these issues as being sinful
or immoral, but rather that investors in principle can and in
practice frequently seem to do so (see Lobe and Walk-
sha¨usl 2011; Capelle-Blancard and Monjon 2014). Ap-
pendix 1 provides a brief description of the fourteen issues.
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Apart from analyzing individual controversial portfolios
we also consider various combinations or clusters, including
the classical Triumvirate of Sin (alcohol, tobacco, and gam-
bling), the so-called 4Bs portfolio of ‘booze, bets, bombs, and
butts’ (alcohol, gambling, controversial weapons, and adult
entertainment), as proposed by Ahrens (2004), the Sextet of
Sin portfolio (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, controversial
weapons, adult entertainment, and nuclear power), as studied
by Lobe andWalksha¨usl (2011), and potentially controversial
medical stocks, comprising firms engaging with abortion,
animal testing, contraceptives, genetic engineering, and em-
bryonic stem cells (labeled asMedical Sin).
We construct our sample of controversial stocks as
follows. Using the ORBIS company database, we employ a
combination of industry classifications (using NAICS and
NACE codes) and elaborate keyword search techniques to
retrieve potentially controversial stocks for each of the
fourteen controversial issues.1 We refine the retrieved
controversial stock lists on a manual basis by checking
general, history, and activity descriptions of each company
on whether that company indeed satisfies our definitions of
‘sinfulness.’ In this way, we end up with a preliminary
sample of controversial stocks for each of the fourteen is-
sues (see row 1 in Table 1). To circumvent survivorship
bias, we include in our sample all dead (delisted) stocks.
The preliminary sample of controversial stocks based on
ORBIS data is matched with Thomson Reuters’ Data-
Stream end-of-the-month Euro data on returns, market
capitalization (price times the number of outstanding
common shares), and USdollar–Euro exchange rates, by
removing the parts for which either data on returns or
market value are not available. We measure returns as the
natural logarithm of a stock’s Total Return index on t = 0
divided by the index on t = -1. The Total Return index is
created by DataStream to depict a stock’s theoretical
growth in value, assuming that dividends are reinvested.
This is in line with Lobe and Walksha¨usl (2011) and Sal-
aber (2013). Additionally, although not very common in
the literature, we carefully and systematically address zero-
returns in stocks’ return series. We require a stock’s return
series to cover at least eleven months of continuous data
(which is in line with Salaber 2009, 2013). Furthermore,
the zero-returns period must not persist longer than
three months or occur more than three times in a possible
eleven months series. If these conditions are satisfied, we
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1 A potential shortcoming of using the ORBIS dataset would be our
inability to directly control for changed company activities, since
searches had to be made within product descriptions which are
updated to the most recent activities. However, potential biases will
be marginal as company involvement in particular controversial
issues generally does not change radically over time, and our searches
within company history descriptions would capture these changes as
well.
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replace these ‘incidental’ zero-returns with the market re-
turn. When the zero-returns are non-incidental, the series
are deleted up to the point for which conditions are satis-
fied, keeping the longest available valid series, in some
cases implying deleting the stock altogether.
After clearing the sample for available return data (as
provided by DataStream), sufficient available return data
(considering zero-returns), and available data on market
value (DataStream), we are left with a total of 1,763 con-
troversial stocks across fourteen issues, which results in
1,634 stocks after removing duplicates. The table in Ap-
pendix 2 shows how these stocks are internationally dis-
tributed over the 94 countries in the sample. Our population
as well as our final sample consists of companies in devel-
oped and emergingmarkets across the world (30.0 % is from
North-America; 28.0 % from Asia; 26.9 % from Europe;
7.2 % from Australasia; 4.8 % from South-America; 3.1 %
from Africa). It appears that most controversial stocks are
from the US (23.4 %), Australia (6.7 %), Japan (6.5 %),
Canada (5.4 %), India and China (5.0 % each).
The total number of controversial stocks in our study is
considerably larger than that of previous studies, which
typically have around 200 controversial stocks using indus-
try classification-based data on the Triumvirate of Sin issues.
Lobe and Walksha¨usl (2011)’s study is a notable exception,
having a sample of 755 sin stocks across the Sextet of Sin
issues. The large sample size of our study is in part the result
of having a broader range of controversial issues. It also is a
direct result of our more detailed sample selection process.
As such, we are able to look into controversial issues with
firms outside the ‘usual suspect’ industries. For instance, our
Sextet of Sin sample consists of 930 firms, whereaswith Lobe
and Walksha¨usl (2011), it is 755. Moreover, our sample of
Triumvirate of Sin stocks is on average more than twice as
large as that in existing studies. Table 1 shows the sample
clearing process with per issue information on the number of
stocks in the remaining investable sample.
In line with the conventional literature, we estimate the
risk-adjusted performance of our controversial portfolios
using the Carhart (1997) regression model. We refrain from
utilizing national market indexes as this would imply ad-
herence to the somewhat ambiguous assumption of com-
pletely home-biased investors, i.e., investors do not invest a
single euro in stocks which are not listed on their domestic
stock exchange. We will follow mainstream finance lit-
erature in assuming (semi-strong) globally efficient and
well-diversified markets. We use the Fama and French
global factors and the US one-month Treasury-bill rate
risk-free rate provided by Kenneth French’s website. Fama
and French (2012) recommend using the global factors in
applications to explain the returns on global portfolios, e.g.,
to evaluate the performance of mutual funds that hold a
global portfolio of stocks, as long as the portfolio does not
have a strong tilt toward microcaps or toward the stocks of
a particular region, in which our sample does not (we took
the factors from: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The Fama–French
factor data are transformed into Euros using DataStream’s
Dollar–Euro exchange rates.
We investigate risk-adjusted returns for controversial
stocks using a Carhart (1997) regression model. To test the
return differences between controversial stocks and the
market portfolio, we estimate zero-investment Carhart re-
gressions (see also Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Salaber
2009). In line with Humphrey and Tan (2014), we analyze
the impact of avoiding controversial stocks on market
capitalization and risk-adjusted return performance by
negatively screening the S&P500. We retrieve the begin-
ning and end-of-the-year constituents list, returns, and
market value data for the S&P500 from DataStream. In
order to construct the negatively screened portfolio, we
delete the stocks belonging to the TotalSin portfolio (all
fourteen issues) from the end-of-the-year S&P500 con-
stituents. We redo the analysis by only excluding the Tri-
umvirate of Sin (alcohol, tobacco, gambling) stocks. The
size and significance of the alphas obtained from the zero-
investment regressions will provide the abnormal perfor-
mance of controversial stocks when benchmarked against
the market (as in Fabozzi et al. 2008) and the negatively
screened market portfolios relative to the unscreened
portfolio (see also Humphrey and Tan 2014).
We use value-weighted returns since these are in accord
with typical practice of SRI or sin investors and funds
(Humphrey and Tan 2014) and are most feasible for in-
stitutional investors, which make up for the largest part of
the SRI market. Moreover, value-weighting is common in
the related literature (e.g., Lobe and Walksha¨usl 2011;
Salaber 2013). Furthermore, the Fama–French market in-
dex is weighted at market value too.
Since our return data are non-normally distributed (as
Jarque–Bera and Anderson–Darling normality tests con-
vincingly establish), we use median regression which em-
ploys a LAD estimator to fit the conditional median of the
response variable. Median regression is a special case of
quantile regression (QR).2 In accord with most of the
2 The value-added of QR is its ability to provide a more complete and
more robust description of the conditional distribution of returns than
ordinary mean regression analysis does. With fat tailed and
asymmetric conditional distributions of the dependent variable,
OLS would, moreover, not give robust and unbiased results. LAD
estimation, in contrast, is robust to fat tails and skewed data (Koenker
and Bassett 1978; Mata and Machado 1996), as it investigates how
returns are affected at the median, which is a better measure of
location and estimator of central tendency. QR techniques are
increasingly popular and have lots of interesting applications in
finance (Koenker and Hallock 2001). See Buhai (2005), Koenker
(2005), McMillen (2013) for in-depth overviews.
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literature, we will carry out the median regressions using
the Design Bootstrap procedure (Basset and Chen 2001;
Baur et al. 2012) with 10,000 replications.
Results
This section presents and discusses the results. We first go
into the size and returns of the various controversial issues
and provide a simple comparison with conventional market
benchmarks. Then we present the estimation results of the
multifactor model.
Table 2 shows the number of controversial stocks in the
various categories as well as their combined market
capitalization for the overall sample, the US, and stocks in
the S&P500. Of the 1,634 controversial stocks, about one-
fifth is related to alcohol, meat, and nuclear power each. As
to market capitalization, firms engaged with contraceptives
and nuclear power have the largest share. Combined these
two categories make up more than half of overall market
capitalization of the 1634 controversial stocks. Interest-
ingly, the market capitalization of firms in adult enter-
tainment and embryonic stem cells is very small. Firms
engaging with meat make up a relatively large number of
the total stocks, but their market capitalization is only
modest. By and large, the same distribution pattern holds
for the US. A notable exception is firms engaging with
alcohol and contraceptives. The former are underrepre-
sented in the US and the latter are overrepresented from an
international perspective. As a result, the Triumvirate of
Sin, 4Bs, and Sextet of Sin have much less market
capitalization in the US sample than in the overall sample.
To put figures in Table 2 in perspective, the total number
of listed companies in the world at the beginning of 2011 is
estimated by the World Federation of Exchanges at 45,595.
Hence, the 1,634 controversial stocks make up about 3 %
of the overall number of stocks. However, in relation to
market capitalization, they make up almost 7 % of the
investment universe. In the US, the S&P500 total market
capitalization at year-end 2012 was € 9,979 bn. Firms en-
gaging with the fourteen sin issues account for about 12 %
of this market capitalization. This means that the employ-
ment of at least some negative screens results in a sub-
stantial loss in terms of size and potential diversification
opportunities. For example, with the Sextet of Sin, US in-
vestors would forego more than 6 % of the investment
universe in terms of market capitalization. Hence, in con-
trast to Humphrey and Tan (2014), we conclude that there
are a large number of controversial stocks to be shunned
from the investment universe when applying negative
screens.
The market-weighted returns for several controversial
clusters and negatively screened portfolios as well as those
of conventional benchmarks are closely aligned. All cor-
relation coefficients are high and highly significant (results
are available upon request). The lowest correlation with the
general market is that of Medical Sin, the Triumvirate of
Sin, and the 4Bs (all less than 60 %).
Table 3 provides the estimation results from regressing
the excess returns of eight value-weighted zero-investment
portfolios on the four Carhart (1997) factors.3 We observe
practically all controversial cluster portfolios to sig-
nificantly outperform the market. In the case of contro-
versial medical stocks, the outperformance is only
marginally significant. The last two comparisons in Table 3
show that negative screening results in statistically sig-
nificant underperformance. These findings suggest that
negative screening can have significant financial costs,
which are to be regarded as an opportunity cost. The results
from Table 3 are well in line with most of the academic
literature (cf. Chong et al. 2006; Jo et al. 2010; Liston and
Soydemir, 2010; Durand et al. 2013b). The results fur-
thermore support the finding of Capelle-Blancard and
Monjon (2014) that the intensity of sector-based screening
significantly impacts risk-adjusted returns. Our findings
also contradict Humphrey and Tan (2014) who suggest that
SRI funds will neither gain nor lose from employing ‘sin’
screens. As to controversial investing, we find that not only
the classical Triumvirate of Sin might offer positive ab-
normal returns, as was established in Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009), but that also investing other controversial clusters
can be financially attractive. We next turn to the attrac-
tiveness of the individual controversial issues.
Table 4 reports the return performance estimations on
the basis of the Carhart model of the fourteen controversial
issues as well as that of a number of controversial clusters.
It shows that some controversial issues are financially more
attractive than others. We find that alcohol, animal testing,
contraceptives, fur, genetic engineering, and tobacco dis-
play statistically as well as economically significant posi-
tive abnormal returns. This underlines as well as specifies
the results reported in Table 3. The findings are well in line
with the predictions by Heinkel et al. (2001), and Hong and
Kacperczyk (2009) that firms with controversial business
activities have to come up with extra-financial performance
in order to keep attracting investors. In this respect, adult
entertainment and stem cells are exceptions as these issues
exhibit mildly significant underperformance.
3 Note that the coefficient of interest, the intercept of our model
(alpha), provides us with an estimate of the median risk-adjusted
returns, not with the average (or expected) risk-adjusted returns.
Furthermore, the interpretation of the Adjusted R-squared is not
analogous to the standard OLS case (see Koenker and Machado 1999
for details).
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Table 2 Number of stocks and total market capitalization in absolute figures and as percentage of the total sample (€bn, 31/12/2012)
Panel A: Total sample of controversial stocks Panel B: US controversial stocks
#Stocks % MC (€bn) % #Stocks % MC (€bn) %
Abortion 4 0.2 234.71 6.3 3 0.8 140.16 9.0
Adult entertainment 20 1.2 0.31 0.0 12 3.1 0.16 0.0
Alcohol 361 22.1 651.69 17.6 30 7.8 69.60 4.5
Animal testing 112 6.9 459.39 12.4 73 19.1 315.42 20.3
Contraceptives 93 5.7 1056.03 28.6 43 11.2 662.69 42.7
Controversial weapons 20 1.2 82.29 2.2 10 2.6 50.85 3.3
Fur 22 1.3 28.31 0.8 3 0.8 0.52 0.0
Gambling 126 7.7 88.85 2.4 48 12.5 15.07 1.0
Genetic engineering 74 4.5 194.64 5.3 33 8.6 58.18 3.7
Meat 403 24.7 192.64 5.2 50 13.1 59.24 3.8
Nuclear power 327 20.0 864.29 23.4 69 18.0 296.27 19.1
Pork 107 6.5 68.66 1.9 16 4.2 18.65 1.2
Stem cells 18 1.1 0.79 0.0 12 3.1 0.49 0.0
Tobacco 76 4.7 492.87 13.3 11 2.9 193.53 12.5
TotalSin 1634 100.0 3698.32 100.0 383 100.0 1553.53 100.0
TotalSin ex. Meat/Pork 1233 75.5 3312.18 89.6 335 87.5 1494.29 96.2
Triumvirate of Sin 563 34.5 1232.78 33.3 89 23.2 278.20 17.9
4Bs 527 32.3 822.51 22.2 100 26.1 135.52 8.7
Sextet of Sin 930 56.9 2179.59 58.9 180 47.0 625.47 40.3
Medical Sin 283 17.3 1749.55 47.3 153 39.9 885.72 57.0
Panel C: Controversial stocks in S&P500
#Stocks % MC (€bn) %
Abortion 1 0.2 140.05 1.4
Adult entertainment – 0.0 – 0.0
Alcohol 7 1.4 29.84 0.3
Animal testing 5 1.0 271.15 2.7
Contraceptives 8 1.6 477.06 4.8
Controversial weapons 3 0.6 46.53 0.5
Fur – 0.0 – 0.0
Gambling – 0.0 – 0.0
Genetic engineering 1 0.2 38.40 0.4
Meat 4 0.8 38.57 0.4
Nuclear power 19 3.8 239.71 2.4
Pork 2 0.4 10.43 0.1
Stem cells – 0.0 – 0.0
Tobacco 4 0.8 183.29 1.8
All controversial stocks 50 10.0 1206.70 12.1
Triumvirate of Sin stocks 10 2.0 213.12 2.1
Complete S&P500 500 100.0 9979.29 100.0
The TotalSin sample includes all the stocks involved with the fourteen controversial issues described in the data section and defined in Appendix
1. The TotalSin ex. Meat/Pork sample is the TotalSin sample minus companies that engage with meat including pork (see definition in Appendix
1). The Triumvirate of Sin refers to the companies involved in alcohol, gambling, and tobacco. The 4Bs portfolio comprises alcohol, gambling,
controversial weapons, and adult entertainment. Sextet of Sin refers to alcohol, tobacco, gambling, controversial weapons, adult entertainment,
and nuclear power. Medical Sin comprises companies engaging with abortion, animal testing, contraceptives, genetic engineering, and em-
bryonic stem cells
* Numbers are based on respectively the TotalSin sample excluding duplicates (Panel A) and the US stocks within this sample (Panel B). Panel C
exhibits the TotalSin and Triumvirate of Sin stocks as benchmarked against the complete S&P500 sample. Note that the numbers for individual
sin portfolios and controversial clusters in some cases differ from the numbers of the TotalSin (overall) sample due to the exclusion of duplicates
in each benchmark sample. E.g., the Medical Sin portfolio consists of companies involved in multiple issues, and consequently its reported
number of stocks and market capitalization are lower than the summation of each individual issue’s portfolio
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Sensitivity Analysis
We employ five additional analyses to check the sensitivity
and robustness of our results. We consecutively focus on a
different market factor, OLS estimation, beginning- versus
end-of-year S&P constituents, pre-crisis versus crisis period,
and equally weighted return calculations. We briefly discuss
our findings below (the results tables for these analyses are
available upon request with the corresponding author).
First, we redid our analyses using a different proxy for
the market portfolio, namely the MSCI All Country World
Index (ACWI). This index very well reflects our sample
distribution. Lam et al. (2012) also use the MSCI ACWI.
The index furthermore shows returns very similar to the
commonly employed MSCI World index (a correlation of
99.8 % during our study period). We find sin portfolios to
exhibit lower outperformance using the MSCI ACWI.
Now, only the Triumvirate of Sin and the 4Bs are sig-
nificant. Results for individual sin portfolios and for the
negative screening analysis remain the same.
Second, we ran our main regressions again using OLS
regression analysis, with Newey-West HAC standard errors
and automatic lag selection (Newey and West 1987, 1994),
in line with other studies (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk 2009;
Liston and Soydemir 2010; Lam et al. 2012; Nofsinger and
Varma 2013). We find that compared to the LAD estima-
tions, the use of OLS generally results in a somewhat lower
outperformance (of roughly 2 % on an annual basis), yet
outperformance remains significant. The results remain
similar for the negatively screened (S&P) portfolios. In
general, this seems to suggest that our results in Table 3
and 4 give a realistic view of the opportunity costs of
negative screening as the results are generally unaffected
by the estimation methodology used.
Table 3 Return performance of zero-investment portfolios, 01/1991–12/2012
aa bMKT bSMB bHML bWML Adj:R2
TotalSin versus Market
TotalSin–Market 0.0091**
(0.0037)
-0.7080***
(0.1140)
-0.2713*
(0.1620)
-0.0846
(0.1503)
0.0523
(0.0815)
0.1747
TotalSin less Meat/Pork–Market 0.0096***
(0.0033)
-0.7504***
(0.1129)
-0.3865***
(0.1349)
-0.1540
(0.1348)
0.0513
(0.0852)
0.1842
Triumvirate of Sin–Market 0.0105***
(0.0032)
-0.7632***
(0.1110)
-0.2121
(0.1824)
-0.0088
(0.1861)
0.0686
(0.1015)
0.1707
4Bs–Market 0.0076***
(0.0028)
-0.5896***
(0.1069)
-0.0101
(0.174)
0.0657
(0.1745)
-0.0534
(0.1257)
0.1400
Sextet of Sin–Market 0.0054*
(0.0030)
-0.5923***
(0.1089)
-0.0450
(0.1742)
0.2270
(0.1589)
0.0158
(0.0925)
0.1496
Medical Sin–Market 0.0091***
(0.0030)
-0.8759***
(0.0979)
-0.7109***
(0.1574)
-0.2718*
(0.1630)
-0.0384
(0.0779)
0.1982
Neg.screened S&P versus Unscreened S&P
S&P less TotalSin–S&P complete -0.0025***
(-0.0025)
0.0619***
(0.0619)
0.0692***
(0.0692)
-0.0216
(-0.0216)
-0.0104
(-0.0104)
0.1032
S&P less Triumvirate of Sin–S&P complete -0.0021***
(-0.0021)
0.0112**
(0.0112)
0.0102
(0.0102)
-0.0058
(-0.0058)
-0.0101
(-0.0101)
0.0436
The Market refers to the return on the Fama–French market index. The TotalSin sample includes all the stocks involved with the fourteen
controversial issues described in the data section and defined in Appendix 1. The TotalSin ex. Meat/Pork sample is the TotalSin sample minus
companies that engage with meat including pork (see definition in Appendix 1). The Triumvirate of Sin refers to the companies involved in
alcohol, gambling, and tobacco. The 4Bs portfolio comprises alcohol, gambling, controversial weapons, and adult entertainment. The Sextet of
Sin refers to alcohol, tobacco, gambling, controversial weapons, adult entertainment, and nuclear power. Medical Sin comprises companies
engaging with abortion, animal testing, contraceptives, genetic engineering, and embryonic stem cells. S&P refers to the S&P500 index. This
table shows the measurement results from regressing the excess returns of various value-weighted zero-investment portfolios on the four Carhart
(1997) factors using LAD estimation. Alpha is the intercept, indicating out- or underperformance relative to the Fama–French market portfolio or
unscreened S&P500. bMKT; bSMB; bHML; and bWML are the coefficients on the market, Size, Book-to-Market, and Momentum factors, re-
spectively, as described by Fama and French (2012). In brackets are the standard errors obtained using the Design Bootstrap procedure (10,000
replications)
* Statistical significance at the 10 % level. ** Statistical significance at the 5 % level. *** Statistical significance at the 1 % level
a We also perform the nonparametric Mann–Whitney U test (Mann and Whitney 1947) to make comparisons between two independent samples,
e.g., the excess return on the TotalSin portfolio vis-a`-vis the excess return on the market portfolio (in line with Lam et al. 2012; Durand 2013b;
Gangi and Trotta 2013). The Mann–Whitney test detects significant outperformance for the Triumvirate of Sin portfolio and mildly significant
outperformance for the 4Bs portfolio
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Table 4 Return performance of controversial portfolios, 01/1991–12/2012
aa bMKT bSMB bHML bWML Adj:R2
Abortion 0.0068*
(0.0039)
0.3592***
(0.1329)
-1.0886***
(0.1859)
-0.3166
(0.248)
-0.0494
(0.1092)
0.0842
Adult entertainment -0.0136*
(0.0070)
0.5653***
(0.2043)
0.2314
(0.381)
0.0117
(0.2624)
-0.2035
(0.2798)
0.0065
Alcohol 0.0093***
(0.0030)
0.2629**
(0.1100)
-0.1614
(0.1637)
0.0707
(0.1799)
0.0347
(0.1255)
0.0260
Animal testing 0.0103***
(0.0039)
0.0913
(0.1107)
-0.8368***
(0.1831)
-0.3809**
(0.1783)
-0.0116
(0.0976)
0.0521
Contraceptives 0.0118***
(0.0037)
0.0930
(0.1151)
-0.8306***
(0.1842)
-0.3762**
(0.1772)
-0.0193
(0.0962)
0.0641
Controversial weapons 0.0084*
(0.0048)
0.4646***
(0.1502)
-0.2358
(0.2549)
0.2124
(0.2143)
0.0339
(0.1411)
0.0273
Fur 0.0119**
(0.0055)
1.0470***
(0.2189)
0.0168
(0.3339)
-0.1314
(0.2799)
-0.2698
(0.1655)
0.1245
Gambling 0.0056
(0.0038)
0.6456***
(0.1521)
0.6832***
(0.1921)
0.0302
(0.1729)
-0.0463
(0.122)
0.1314
Genetic engineering 0.0100***
(0.0034)
0.7195***
(0.1206)
0.0253
(0.2984)
-0.1314
(0.1901)
-0.0004
(0.139)
0.0982
Meat 0.0050
(0.0038)
0.4583***
(0.1496)
-0.2999
(0.2001)
0.2604*
(0.1483)
-0.0539
(0.1001)
0.0566
Nuclear power 0.0026
(0.0025)
0.5789***
(0.0936)
-0.0047
(0.1144)
0.3247***
(0.1091)
-0.0014
(0.0673)
0.1257
Pork 0.0023
(0.0048)
0.4804***
(0.1823)
-0.4399
(0.3085)
0.3107
(0.2749)
-0.005
(0.1565)
0.0228
Stem cells -0.0173*
(0.0102)
0.9776***
(0.2436)
3.2035***
(0.5132)
-1.4949***
(0.3335)
0.0791
(0.2132)
0.1594
Tobacco 0.0166***
(0.0046)
0.1724
(0.1166)
-0.4197**
(0.176)
0.0644
(0.1582)
0.0554
(0.0998)
0.0076
TotalSin 0.0104***
(0.0035)
0.2957***
(0.1115)
-0.2368
(0.1615)
-0.0600
(0.1552)
0.0419
(0.0835)
0.0550
TotalSin excl. Meat/Pork 0.0112***
(0.0032)
0.2633**
(0.1118)
-0.4374***
(0.1408)
-0.1725
(0.1398)
0.0655
(0.0880)
0.0659
Triumvirate of Sin 0.0124***
(0.0032)
0.2410**
(0.1099)
-0.3110*
(0.1827)
0.0461
(0.1917)
0.0613
(0.1015)
0.0209
4Bs 0.0090***
(0.0030)
0.4150***
(0.1085)
-0.0102
(0.1796)
0.1110
(0.1785)
-0.0421
(0.1267)
0.0385
Sextet of Sin 0.0069**
(0.0030)
0.3984***
(0.1096)
-0.0418
(0.1715)
0.1925
(0.1595)
0.0298
(0.0900)
0.0683
Medical Sin 0.0105***
(0.0032)
0.1387
(0.0990)
-0.7400***
(0.1603)
-0.2863*
(0.1593)
-0.0301
(0.0777)
0.0689
TotalSin sample includes all the stocks involved with the fourteen controversial issues described in the data section and defined in Appendix 1.
The TotalSin ex. Meat/Pork sample is the TotalSin sample minus companies that engage with meat including pork (see definition in Appendix 1).
The Triumvirate of Sin refers to the companies involved in alcohol, gambling, and tobacco. The 4Bs portfolio comprises alcohol, gambling,
controversial weapons, and adult entertainment. The Sextet of Sin refers to alcohol, tobacco, gambling, controversial weapons, adult enter-
tainment, and nuclear power. Medical Sin comprises companies engaging with abortion, animal testing, contraceptives, genetic engineering, and
embryonic stem cells. This table shows the measurement results from regressing the excess returns of the value-weighted individual and
combined controversial portfolios on the four Carhart (1997) factors using LAD estimation. Alpha is the intercept, indicating the size and
significance of abnormal returns. bMKT, bSMB, bHML, and bWML are the coefficients on the market, Size, Book-to-Market, and Momentum factors,
respectively, as described by Fama and French (2012). In brackets are the standard errors obtained using the Design Bootstrap procedure (10,000
replications)
* Statistical significance at the 10 % level. ** Statistical significance at the 5 % level. *** Statistical significance at the 1 % level
a We furthermore perform a nonparametric one-sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (Wilcoxon 1945). Results are roughly similar to the LAD
estimations, yet the Wilcoxon test labels all sectors significant except adult entertainment and stem cells
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Third, we redid the screening analysis using beginning
instead of end-of-year index constituents for screening out
controversial stocks. Here, the results remain similar and
hence appear to be robust in this respect.
Fourth, we considered the ‘Great Recession,’ which
indicates the financial crises period 12/2007–12/2012 (in
line with Salaber 2009; Nofsinger and Varma 2013). We
compare this with the entire (pre-crisis) period until
11/2007.4 We establish that our results are in line with
Salaber (2009) and Campus (2013). Nearly, all combined
controversial portfolios beat the market during the reces-
sionary period in an economically significant way (on av-
erage they reach an annualized outperformance of 14.1 %).
However, only with the Triumvirate of Sin portfolio, these
results are statistically significant. With respect to the indi-
vidual controversial portfolios, we find alcohol, contracep-
tives, fur, meat, and tobacco stocks to perform particularly
well (but statistical significance can only be established for
alcohol stocks). In addition, controversial stocks on average
show increased ordinary and downside risk, but this increase
is about twice as small compared to the market index. This is
in line with the notion of sin stocks being recession-proof
investments (e.g., Ahrens 2004). However, we find no evi-
dence of reduced downside risk for either responsible or sin
investments during the crisis. For the pre-crisis period, the
outperformance of controversial investments is lower. Still,
most controversial clusters show statistically significant
outperformance. Individual issues that drive these results are
alcohol, contraceptives, controversial weapons, genetic
engineering, and tobacco. In addition, both the Triumvirate
of Sin and Medical Sin portfolios beat the market in a sta-
tistically significant way. As to responsible investments
(negatively screened S&P500), we find no significant ab-
normal returns during the crisis period (contrary to Gangi
and Trotta 2013; Nofsinger and Varma 2013). For the pre-
crisis period, negative screening nevertheless leads to sig-
nificant underperformance (in line with Nofsinger and
Varma 2013). Please keep in mind the fact that in the crisis
period the market as a whole showed a lot of turbulence (by
definition). As a result, the relative performance of the
controversial stocks seems to have improved in a period
when the market as a whole performed very badly.
In our last sensitivity analysis, we calculated returns using
equally weighted portfolios instead of value-weighted ones.
Here, we arrive at different results. With equal weights, we
find no out or underperformance of controversial clusters.On
the part of the individual controversial portfolios, only to-
bacco stocks keep statistically significant outperformance,
whereas gambling, pork, and stem cells underperform.
Controversial clusters now are found to underperform the
market but not in a statistically significant way. Results for
negative screening remain very similar relative to our main
analysis. The differences inmeasurement results on the basis
of portfolio composition do not have to be problematic. As
argued for above, equal-weighting might not be feasible or
desirable, particularly for institutional investors. In all, our
findings are in part contingent on return averaging methods
and estimation techniques. Yet, we have justified the pref-
erence of our methods over alternatives by referring to the
use and purpose of our study, which renders our main ana-
lysis empirically adequate (van Fraassen 2008).
Conclusion
Portfolio management relies on diversification. The default
investment is the market portfolio, which is a value-weighted
portfolio of all investable securities. But investors are a
heterogeneous group, which increasingly wish their invest-
ments to reflect their values and beliefs. This can result in
excluding particular firms and/or industries. We investigate
the impact of such negative screening on their investment
universe as well as on financial performance. We investigate
fourteen potentially controversial issues: abortion, adult en-
tertainment, alcohol, animal testing, contraceptives, contro-
versial weapons, fur, gambling, genetic engineering, meat,
nuclear power, pork, (embryonic) stem cells, and tobacco.
Some of these issues are well-established reasons for exclu-
sionary screens in responsible investment portfolios. Others
are less prevalent but are already used in private mandates.
More and more controversial issues are likely to come play a
role in responsible investing. We employ four-factor time-
series mean and median regressions using a uniquely con-
structed sample of 1763 stocks across the fourteen potentially
controversial issues over the period 01/1991–12/2012.
In case an investor employs negative screens, we find that
the universe of investment objects can become substantially
smaller. The extent towhich this is the case highly depends on
the screen being applied. For example, screening for adult
entertainment, fur, and stem cells does have a very limited
impact on the investment universe, both in terms of number of
stocks and in terms of market capitalization excluded. How-
ever, with screens for alcohol and nuclear power, investors
forego both a large number of investment objects as well as
substantial market capitalization. Most studies so far either
argued or assumed screening had only limited impact
(e.g., Salaber 2009; Lobe and Walkha¨usl 2011; Humphrey
4 We conduct Quant-Andrews tests on our regression outputs to
detect possible structural breakpoints in our data (see Andrews 1993).
We were unable to establish potential breakpoints in our time series,
implying that stock performance has been relatively even over the
entire study period. Consequently, we use an ex-ante starting and
ending period of the recent global financial crisis. We ignore
intermediate periods of crises, the most prominent example of which
is the Dot-Com crisis, as it is hard to find an objective demarcated
time period of those crises for our global sample.
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and Tan 2014). We, however, contend that it does matter,
depending on the market and the screen.
Furthermore, we establish that there seems to be a price
to screening, namely the opportunity cost of refraining
from investing in controversial firms. Again, this cost is
dependent upon the type of screen. For example, while we
find most controversial clusters to significantly outperform
the market, this is not the case for the so-called Sextet of
Sin (alcohol, tobacco, gambling, controversial weapons,
adult entertainment, and nuclear power). These findings are
in line with, for example, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and
Lobe and Walksha¨usl (2011). In addition, we find a
screened market portfolio (S&P500) to significantly un-
derperform the unscreened market portfolio when ac-
counting for conventional risk factors. In the end, it is for
the investor to decide whether this ‘price’ is worth it. The
impact of screening on performance shows that there in-
deed can be a trade-off between values and beliefs on the
one hand and financial returns on the other. If the investor
really wants to refrain from particular activities, screening
is a practical tool to do so.
A limitation of our study is that it involves an enormous
amount of work to arrive at a list of firms that engage with
controversial issues which in the end is sensitive to subjective
assessment. This contrasts with simply selecting particular in-
dustries and shunningall thefirms in such an industry.However,
our approach is much more detailed and exact. Since the future
for SRI and negative screeningwill probably lie in puttingmore
and more issues under public scrutiny (e.g., factory farming,
coal, palmoil), we need insights into the relative performance of
these issues as well. This might involve exploring the impact on
private equity and debt markets, as some industries engaging
with particular controversial issues primarily relyon these forms
of financing. Additionally, an important next step is the study of
the relative pay-offs and effectiveness of various other SRI
strategies, even within ‘sin’ investing (cf. Cai et al. 2012). Our
future research will be directed at the potential effects of new
screens aswell as on the effects of responsible and controversial
investing on CSR and company behavior.
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Appendix 1
Definitions of controversial issues
The demarcation of specific controversial issues or ‘sins’ is
an inevitably subjective process. Differences exist firstly in
the specific definitions of the sin screens employed by
different ESG raters and SRI funds. For instance, there may
be differing opinions on whether normal and emergency
contraceptive pills should be regarded as abortifacients.
Secondly, the sin categories may be treated separately or
combined. We combine, e.g., abortion providers with
abortifacients providers and embryonic stem cells with
human cloning, as their topic of concern is identical.
Our attempt is to employ screens that are as ‘objective’
as possible and share universal consensus to the highest
possible extent. We base the analysis on strict and narrow
definitions of ‘sin,’ which are in line with commonly em-
ployed definitions of ‘sin’ by ESG raters and SRI funds
(see Renneboog et al. 2008; Fabozzi et al. 2008; MSCI
2013). No revenue or ownership threshold items are in-
cluded however (which is common among practitioners).
This means that, for instance, Wal-Mart, which might not
derive more than 10 % of its revenue from selling alcohol
or tobacco, is not selected in our exclusion list of these
issues. We see no fundamental reasons why thresholds
should be employed by sin-shunning SRI investors. There
is no company ‘‘only 10 % involved’’ or ‘‘10 % sinful’’,
which would then mysteriously imply a complete acquittal
of sin. Nonetheless, it may in some cases be hard to draw a
line at where involvement exists and where it does not. For
instance, producers of mobile phones, computers, and
games may all be (indirectly) related to the production or
distribution of adult entertainment (e.g., Woodbridge
2011). We therefore only select companies that are targeted
at, i.e., ‘directly’ and ‘obviously’ (from the perspective of
the average investor) involved in, particular issues and
elaborately motivate each demarcation. Investors that
consciously do not want to invest in—say—abortifacients
or contraceptives generally will not hold stocks of Pfizer or
Sanofi, irrespective of whether the companies in question
derive more or less part of their revenue of those particular
products. This enterprise has as its main advantages that it
approaches objectivity and universality and is directly
relevant to and applicable by the SRI investor, and all
measurement results remain comparable and insightful.
This means that relative to the purpose and use of our
study, it adequately represents the real world (see van
Fraassen 2008).
Below we briefly list the definitions of the various
screens. Retrieved exclusion lists from ORBIS are care-
fully checked, particularly on whether company activity
descriptions include the desired results, whether the com-
pany is really ‘’sinful’’ according to our definitions.
Abortion/Abortifacients
Companies owning or operating facilities where abortions are
performed, abortion providers, abortifacient manufacturers.
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This does not include contraceptives, insurance companies
that pay for elective abortions, and companies that provide
financial support to Planned Parenthood. Note There are dif-
ferences in what individual investors might view as abortion/
abortifacient. Birth control pills/contraceptives are not se-
lected here but may be excluded by some investors who view
(‘normal’ and emergency) contraceptive pills as abortifacient.
Adult Entertainment
Companies targeted at the production or distribution of
sexually explicit products and services, i.e., X-rated films,
online products, production studios, printed materials, TV
or radio programs, and adult clubs or bars. Note A narrow
definition of adult entertainment is employed which does
not include broad entertainment or on-demand video pro-
vider companies with marginal links to the adult enter-
tainment industry.
Alcohol
Companies that have as its business the production and/or
distribution of alcoholic products, including breweries,
wineries, alcoholic beverage stores, wholesalers, and
drinking places and excluding supermarkets, restaurants,
etc.
Animal Testing
Companies do research or perform tests on animals for
medical and cosmetic reasons (to determine safety and
efficacy of particular products).
Contraceptives
Companies involved in the manufacturing of contracep-
tives, e.g., birth control pills, IUDs, sterilization procedures
providers, condom manufacturers, and so on.
Controversial Weapons
Companies involved in nuclear, biological, chemical
weapons, cluster munitions, and antipersonnel mines. This
does not include companies that target at detection, safety,
and other products or services. Note Controversial weapons
can include different things in different countries. The case
is further complicated as—according to international hu-
manitarian and criminal law—also the trade in conven-
tional arms can be regarded controversial if these weapons
are destined for countries where human rights are violated
or where genocide, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity are committed. Nonetheless, for the purpose of
most SRI investors, there appears to be a great degree of
consensus about the above definition. See, e.g., ‘‘Delta
Lloyd AM excluded companies’’ and MSCI (2013).
Fur industry
Companies that manufacture, sell, or distribute fur
products.
Gambling
Companies that manufacture, own, or operate gambling
machines or equipment, casinos, lotteries, betting ac-
tivities, and so on. This excludes operators or owners of
restaurants, hotels/motels, and broad (or non-gambling)
entertainment activities.
Genetic Engineering
Companies perform genetic engineering or modification
techniques for medical or agricultural or other purposes.
Meat
Companies involved in slaughtering, fishing, and process-
ing of meat products. This does not include companies that
are only involved in hogs, breading, etc.
Nuclear Power
Companies operating, constructing, or owning nuclear
power plants or utilities, as well as companies involved in
uranium mining.
Pork
Companies involved in the production, procession or
wholesale distribution of pork products, in line with the
‘Meat’ sector’s definition.
Stem Cells
Companies involved in (research in) embryonic stemcells, as
well as human cloning. Note We account for human em-
bryonic stem cell research, as this is the form of stem cell
research controversy is generally about. Similarly, cloning
research is limited to human cloning. SRI funds (e.g., in
Germany) may screen on this particular instance of cloning.
Tobacco
Companies involved in the production, processing and
wholesale distribution of tobacco products. This does not in-
clude broad stores, supermarkets, and other threshold items.
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Appendix 2
Countries included in the sample of controversial stocks
#Stocks in sample % of total
UNITED STATES 383 23.4
AUSTRALIA 110 6.7
JAPAN 106 6.5
CANADA 89 5.4
INDIA 82 5.0
CHINA 81 5.0
UNITED KINGDOM 72 4.4
FRANCE 52 3.2
KOREA. REPUBLIC OF 45 2.8
GERMANY 40 2.4
POLAND 24 1.5
MALAYSIA 23 1.4
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 23 1.4
BULGARIA 20 1.2
GREECE 18 1.1
CROATIA 17 1.0
BRAZIL 16 1.0
SOUTH AFRICA 16 1.0
UKRAINE 15 0.9
CHILE 14 0.9
SPAIN 13 0.8
NORWAY 13 0.8
SWEDEN 13 0.8
BERMUDA 12 0.7
SRI LANKA 12 0.7
PERU 11 0.7
THAILAND 11 0.7
TAIWAN. PROVINCE OF CHINA 11 0.7
EGYPT 10 0.6
ISRAEL 10 0.6
CAYMAN ISLANDS 10 0.6
PHILIPPINES 10 0.6
SWITZERLAND 9 0.6
SINGAPORE 9 0.6
ARGENTINA 8 0.5
ICELAND 8 0.5
NETHERLANDS 8 0.5
ROMANIA 8 0.5
SERBIA 8 0.5
AUSTRIA 7 0.4
BANGLADESH 7 0.4
DENMARK 7 0.4
FINLAND 7 0.4
JORDAN 7 0.4
MEXICO 7 0.4
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continued
#Stocks in sample % of total
NEW ZEALAND 7 0.4
OMAN 7 0.4
TURKEY 7 0.4
BELGIUM 6 0.4
HONG KONG 6 0.4
HUNGARY 6 0.4
ITALY 6 0.4
LITHUANIA 6 0.4
PORTUGAL 6 0.4
INDONESIA 5 0.3
IRELAND 5 0.3
NIGERIA 5 0.3
CYPRUS 4 0.2
CZECH REPUBLIC 4 0.2
KUWAIT 4 0.2
PAKISTAN 4 0.2
SAUDI ARABIA 4 0.2
SLOVENIA 4 0.2
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 3 0.2
COSTA RICA 3 0.2
GIBRALTAR 3 0.2
LUXEMBOURG 3 0.2
MOROCCO 3 0.2
MAURITIUS 3 0.2
VIRGIN ISLANDS, BRITISH 3 0.2
ZAMBIA 3 0.2
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2 0.1
ECUADOR 2 0.1
ESTONIA 2 0.1
GHANA 2 0.1
KENYA 2 0.1
MACEDONIA, FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF 2 0.1
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED 2 0.1
VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF 2 0.1
ZIMBABWE 2 0.1
BAHRAIN 1 0.1
BOTSWANA 1 0.1
COˆTE D’IVOIRE 1 0.1
FAROE ISLANDS 1 0.1
JERSEY 1 0.1
LATVIA 1 0.1
MONACO 1 0.1
MONTENEGRO 1 0.1
MALTA 1 0.1
NAMIBIA 1 0.1
QATAR 1 0.1
RWANDA 1 0.1
P. J. Trinks, B. Scholtens
123
References
Ahrens, D. (2004). Investing in vice: The recession-proof portfolio of
booze, bets, bombs, and butts. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Andrews, D. W. K. (1993). Tests for parameter instability and
structural change with unknown change point. Econometrica,
61(4), 821–856.
Bassett, G. W, Jr, & Chen, H. (2001). Portfolio style: Return-based
attribution using quantile regression. Empirical Economics,
26(1), 293–305.
Baur, D. G., Dimpfl, T., & Jung, R. C. (2012). Stock return
autocorrelations revisited: A quantile regression approach.
Journal of Empirical Finance, 19(2), 254–265.
Buhai, I. S. (2005). Quantile regression: Overview and selected
applications. Ad-Astra-The Young Romanian Scientists Journal,
4(1), 1–17.
Cai, Y., Jo, H., & Pan, C. (2012). Doing well while doing bad? CSR
in controversial industry sectors. Journal of Business Ethics,
108(4), 467–480.
Campus, R. P. (2013). Do Sin Stocks outperform the market during
recessionary and expansionary periods? Unpublished working
paper, University of Puerto Rico. http://cbt2.nsuok.edu/kwok/
conference/submissions/swfa2013_submission_112.pdf. Accessed
2 Jan 2014.
Capelle-Blancard, G., & Monjon, S. (2014). The performance of
socially responsible funds: Does the screening process matter?
European Financial Management, 20(3), 494–520.
Carhart, C. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance.
Journal of Finance, 45(5), 57–82.
Chong, J., Her, M., & Phillips, G. M. (2006). To sin or not to sin?
Now that’s the question. Journal of Asset Management, 6(6),
406–417.
de Bruin, B. (2013). Socially responsible investment in the alcohol
industry: An assessment of investor attitudes and ethical
arguments. Contemporary Social Science, 8(1), 58–70.
de Colle, S., & York, J. G. (2009). Why wine is not glue? The
unresolved problem of negative screening in socially responsible
investing. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(1), 83–95.
Durand, R. B., Koh, S., & Limkriangkrai, M. (2013a). Saints versus
Sinners. Does morality matter? Journal of International Finan-
cial Markets, Institutions and Money, 24(4), 166–183.
Durand, R. B., Koh, S., & Tan, P. L. (2013b). The price of sin in the
pacific-basin. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 21(1), 899–913.
Eurosif (2014). European SRI study 2014. http://www.eurosif.org/
semantics/uploads/2014/09/Eurosif-SRI-Study-2014.pdf. Accessed
10 Oct 2014.
Fabozzi, F. J., Ma, K. C., & Oliphant, B. J. (2008). Sin stock returns.
The Journal of Portfolio Management, 35(1), 82–94.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2012). Size, value, and momentum in
international stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics,
105(3), 457–472.
Gangi, F., & Trotta, C. (2013). The ethical finance as a response to the
financial crises: An empirical survey of European SRFs perfor-
mance. Journal of Management and Governance,. doi:10.1007/
s10997-013-9264-7.
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2012). Global sustainable
investment review. http://gsiareview2012.gsi-alliance.org/. Ac-
cessed 8 Oct 2014.
Heinkel, R., Kraus, A., & Zechner, J. (2001). The effect of green
investment on corporate behavior. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 36(4), 431–449.
Hong, H., & Kacperczyk, M. (2009). The price of sin: The effects of
social norms on markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1),
15–36.
Hood, M., Nofsinger, J. R., & Varma, A. (2014). Conservation,
discrimination, and salvation: Investors’ social concerns in the
stock market. Journal of Financial Services Research, 45(1), 5–37.
Humphrey, J. E., & Tan, D. T. (2014). Does it really hurt to be
responsible? Journal of Business Ethics, 122(3), 375–386.
Jo, H., Saha, T., Sharma, R., & Wright, S. (2010). Socially
responsible investing versus vice investing. Unpublished work-
ing paper, Santa Clara University. http://www.aabri.com/
LV2010Manuscripts/LV10107.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2014.
Kiymaz, H. (2012). SRI mutual fund and index performance. In H.
K. Baker & J. R. Nofsinger (Eds.), Socially responsible finance
and investing: financial institutions, corporations, investors, and
activists (pp. 425–442). Hoboken: Wiley.
Koenker, R. (2005). Quantile regression. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Koenker, R., & Basset, G. (1978). Regression quantiles. Economet-
rica, 46(1), 33–50.
Koenker, R., & Hallock, K. F. (2001). Quantile regression. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 143–156.
Koenker, R., & Machado, J. (1999). Goodness of fit and related
inference processes for quantile regression. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 94(448), 1296–1310.
Kumar, A., Page, J. K., & Spalt, O. G. (2011). Religious beliefs,
gambling attitudes, and financial market outcomes. Journal of
Financial Economics, 102(3), 671–708.
Lam, S., Jacob, G. H., Yee, A. T. S. (2012). Socially responsible
investment styles: equity risk, return and valuation. Unpublished
working paper, National University of Singapore. http://www.
cbern.ca/UserFiles/Servers/Server_625664/Image/CBERN%
20Events/PRI2012/Papers/Jacob.pdf. Accessed 01 Jan 2014.
Landier, A., & Nair, V. B. (2009). Investing for change: Profit from
responsible investment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Liston, D. P., & Soydemir, G. (2010). Faith-based and sin portfolios:
An empirical inquiry into norm-neglect vs norm-conforming
investor behavior. Managerial Finance, 36(10), 876–885.
Lobe, S., & Walksha¨usl, C. (2011). Vice versus virtue investing
around the world. Unpublished working paper, University of
Regensburg. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1089827. Accessed
02 Jan 2014.
Mann, H. B., & Whitney, D. R. (1947). On a test of whether one of
two random variables is stochastically larger than the other.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 18(1), 50–60.
Margolis, J. D., Elfenbein,H.A.,&Walsh, J. P. (2009).Does it pay to be
good. And does it matter? A meta-analysis of the relationship
between corporate social and financial performance. Unpublished
working paper, Harvard University. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1866371. Accessed 21 Oct 2014.
Mata, J., & Machado, J. A. (1996). Firm start-up size: A conditional
quantile approach. European Economic Review, 40(6),
1305–1323.
McMillen, D. P. (2013). Quantile regression: An overview’ and
‘linear and nonparametric quantile regression. In J. A. F.
continued
#Stocks in sample % of total
TUNISIA 1 0.1
UGANDA 1 0.1
The Opportunity Cost of Negative Screening in Socially Responsible Investing
123
Machado & J. Mata (Eds.), Quantile regression for spatial data.
New York: Springer.
MSCI (2013). Business involvement screening research. definitions
and scope. http://help.riskmetrics.com/Screener/Content/Metho
dology/Business_Involv_Meth.pdf. Accessed 09 Jan 2014.
Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987). A simple positive-definite
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent covariance
matrix. Econometrica, 55(3), 703–708.
Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1994). Automatic lag selection in
covariance matrix estimation. Review of Economic Studies,
61(4), 631–653.
Nofsinger, J. R., & Varma, A. (2013). Socially responsible funds and
market crises. Journal of Banking & Finance,. doi:10.1016/j.
jbankfin.2013.12.016.
Renneboog, L., ter Horst, J., & Zhang, C. (2008). Socially responsible
investments: Institutional aspects, performance, and investor
behavior. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(9), 1723–1742.
Richardson, B. J. (2013). Socially responsible investing for sustain-
ability: Overcoming Its incomplete and conflicting rationales.
Transnational Environmental Law, 2(2), 311–338.
Salaber, J. (2009). Sin stock returns over the business cycle.
Unpublished working paper, University of Bath. http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443188. Accessed 02
Jan 2014.
Salaber, J. (2013). Religion and returns in Europe. European Journal
of Political Economy, 32(1), 149–160.
Sandberg, J., Juravle, C., Hedesstro¨m, T. M., & Hamilton, I. (2009).
The Heterogeneity of socially responsible investment. Journal of
Business Ethics, 87(4), 519–533.
Scholtens, B. (2014). Indicators of responsible investing. Ecological
Indicators, 36(1), 382–385.
Scholtens, B., & Sieva¨nen, R. (2013). Drivers of socially responsible
investing: A case study of four nordic countries. Journal of
Business Ethics, 115(3), 605–616.
Schwarz, M. S. (2003). The ‘‘Ethics’’ of ethical investing. Journal of
Business Ethics, 43(3), 195–213.
Sparkes, R., & Cowton, C. J. (2004). The maturing of socially
responsible investment: A review of the developing link with
corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 52(1),
45–57.
van Fraassen, B. C. (2008). Scientific representation: Paradoxes of
perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Visaltanachoti, N., Zou, L., Zheng, Q. (2009). The performances of
sin stocks in China. Unpublished working paper Massey
University. http://www.fma.org/Reno/Papers/sinstock.pdf. Ac-
cessed 02 Jan 2014.
Wilcoxon, F. (1945). Individual comparisons by ranking methods.
Biometrics Bulletin, 1(6), 80–83.
Woodbridge, V. (2011). Pornography in your investment portfolio?
Ecumenical council for corporate responsibility (ECCR). Bul-
letin, 82(1), 5–11.
P. J. Trinks, B. Scholtens
123
